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ANDRE´ F. J. and CARDENETE M. A. Designing efficient subsidy policies in a regional economy: a multicriteria decision-making
(MCDM)-computable general equilibrium (CGE) approach, Regional Studies. Since policy-makers usually pursue several conflicting
objectives, policy-making can be understood as a multicriteria decision problem. Following the methodological proposal by ANDRE´
and CARDENETE (2005), multi-objective programming is used in connection with a computable general equilibrium model to
represent optimal policy-making and to obtain so-called efficient policies in an application to a regional economy (Andalusia,
Spain). This approach is applied to the design of subsidy policies under two different scenarios. In the first scenario, it is assumed
that the government is concerned just about two objectives: ensuring the profitability of a key strategic sector and increasing
overall output. Finally, the scope of the exercise is enlarged by solving a problem with seven policy objectives, including both
general and sectorial objectives. It is concluded that the observed policy could have been Pareto-improved in several directions.
Multi-objective programming Computable general equilibrium model Efficient policy Subsidies
ANDRE´ F. J. et CARDENETE M. A. Mettre au point des politiques rationnelles en faveur des subventions dans le cadre d’une
e´conomie re´gionale: une fac¸on MCDM-CGE, Regional Studies. Vu que normalement les de´cideurs poursuivent plusieurs objectifs
contradictoires, on pourrait conside´rer la prise de de´cisions comme un proble`me a` crite`res multiples. Conforme´ment a` l’approche
propose´e par Anre´ et Cardenete (2005), on emploie une programmation a` objectifs multiples conjointement avec un mode`le
d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral sur ordinateur afin de repre´senter la prise de de´cisons optimales et pour engendrer des soi-disant politiques
rationnelles en l’appliquant a` une e´conomie re´gionale (a` savoir l’Andalousie, en Espagne). On applique cette approche a` la
mise au point des politiques en faveur des subventions dans deux cadres diffe´rents. En premier, on laisse supposer que le gouverne-
ment ne s’occupe que de deux objectifs: assurer la rentabilite´ d’un secteur de pointe et augmenter le rendement global. En deux-
ie`me, on e´largit la porte´e de l’e´tude en re´solvant un proble`me a` sept objectifs, y compris des objectifs ge´ne´raux et sectoriels. On
conclut que l’on aurait pu ame´liorer la politique observe´e dans divers domaines compte tenu de Pareto.
Programmation a` objectifs multiples Mode`le d’e´quilibre ge´ne´ral sur ordinateur Politique rationnelle Subventions
ANDRE´ F. J. und CARDENETE M. A. Gestaltung effizienter Subventionspolitiken in einer Regionalwirtschaft. Ein MCDM-CGE-
Ansatz, Regional Studies. Da Politiker in der Regel mehrere, einander widersprechende Ziele verfolgen, la¨sst sich Politik als multi-
kriterielles Entscheidungsproblem auffassen. Unter Befolgung des methodologischen Vorschlags von ANDRE´ und CARDENETE
(2005) setzen wir eine multikriterielle Programmierung in Verbindung mit einem berechenbaren allgemeinen Gleichgewichts-
modell in einer Anwendung fu¨r eine Regionalwirtschaft (Andalusien, Spanien) ein, um optimale Politik darzustellen und sogen-
annte effiziente Politiken zu erhalten. Diesen Ansatz wenden wir in zwei verschiedenen Szenarien auf die Gestaltung von
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Subventionspolitiken an. Im ersten Szenario gehen wir davon aus, dass die Regierung nur zwei Ziele verfolgt: die Sicherstellung
der Rentabilita¨t eines zentralen strategischen Sektors sowie die Erho¨hung der allgemeinen Leistung. Anschließend erweitern wir
den Rahmen dieser U¨bung, indem wir ein Problem mit sieben politischen Zielen lo¨sen, zu denen sowohl allgemeine als auch
sektorale Ziele geho¨ren. Wir ziehen den Schluss, dass die beobachtete Politik in mehreren Richtungen einer Pareto-Verbesserung
ha¨tte unterzogen werden ko¨nnen.
Multikriterielle Programmierung Berechenbares allgemeines Gleichgewichtsmodell Effiziente Politik Subventionen
ANDRE´ F. J. y CARDENETE M. A. Disen˜o de polı´ticas eficaces de subsidio en una economı´a regional. Un enfoque MCDM-CGE,
Regional Studies. Dado que los responsables polı´ticos suelen buscar en general diferentes objetivos conflictivos, la elaboracio´n de
polı´ticas puede entenderse como un problema de decisiones con muchos criterios. Siguiendo las propuestas metodolo´gicas
de ANDRE´ y CARDENETE (2005), usamos una programacio´n con muchos objetivos con relacio´n a un modelo computable de
equilibrio general para representar la elaboracio´n o´ptima de polı´ticas y obtener las llamadas polı´ticas eficaces en una aplicacio´n
de economı´a regional (Andalucı´a, Espan˜a). Aplicamos este planteamiento al disen˜o de las polı´ticas de subsidios en dos casos
diferentes. En el primer caso, suponemos que al gobierno le preocupan so´lo dos objetivos: asegurar la rentabilidad de un sector
estrate´gico clave y aumentar la productividad general. Luego aumentamos el alcance del ejercicio resolviendo un problema con
siete objetivos polı´ticos, incluyendo los objetivos generales y sectoriales. Concluimos que la polı´tica observada podrı´a haber
sido mejorada en el diagrama de Pareto en varias direcciones.
Programacio´n con muchos objetivos Modelo de equilibrio general computable Polı´tica eficaz Subsidios
JEL classifications: C61, C68, D78, R13
INTRODUCTION
The design of macroeconomic policies is an important
issue in economics presenting important theoretical
and applied challenges (for example, HOLBROOK,
1972; and CHOW, 1973; or, more recently, FAIR and
HOWREY, 1996). The traditional way to model the
design of an optimal economic policy involves assuming
that a social planner aims at minimizing some social loss
function or maximizing some social welfare function,
typically identified with the utility function of a repre-
sentative consumer (for a pioneering work, see
RAMSEY, 1927). This approach provides a theoretically
elegant tool that links the original economic problem to
the operational field of optimization theory. Neverthe-
less, this classical approach also presents some shortcom-
ings concerning its realism and implement ability in
practice.
To apply this classical approach, a suitable welfare func-
tion representing the preferences of society is needed.
This requirement is an important difficulty from an oper-
ational point of view. Intuitive reasoning states that such a
function can be very hard to find, and one’s intuition is
reinforced by the Social Choice line of research pio-
neered by ARROW (1963), showing that in standard con-
texts it is virtually not possible to combine the preferences
of all members of the society in a single social preference
relationship, with reasonable properties. On the other
hand, direct observation of the usual practice in policy-
making does not seem consistent with the optimization
of a single specific function. Rather, policy-makers
appear to be concerned about a bundle of macroeco-
nomic indicators such as growth rate, inflation rate,
unemployment rate, public deficit or foreign deficit,
and they aim at improving the performance of the
economy as measured by these indicators. In other
words, the government typically faces a decision
problem with several goals or objectives. Moreover,
these objectives usually conflict with each other. For
example, an active anti-unemployment policy could
foster inflation; increasing economic growth could be
harmful for the foreign sector, and so on.
Multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques
are specifically aimed at dealing with these kinds of
situations in which there are multiple conflicting
goals. Several particular techniques, such as multi-
objective programming, compromise programming,
goal programming and others, have been fruitfully
applied to many economic problems in which it is
not reasonable or operational to assume the existence
of a single goal or objective. For an introduction to
multicriteria techniques and their applications to econ-
omic problems, see BALLESTERO and ROMERO (1998);
or for a state-of-the-art review, see FIGUEIRA et al.
(2004). ANDRE´ and CARDENETE (2005) and Q1ANDRE´
et al. (2008) proposed to use MCDM analysis con-
nected to a computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model to address the design of macroeconomic
policies. The arguments for such an approach are
twofold. Firstly, from a conceptual perspective, it
seems a sensible way to understand and represent the
concerns and the practices actually followed by
policy-makers. Secondly, from an empirical perspec-
tive, MCDM techniques, if properly applied, can be
of considerable help to get operative policy recommen-
dations and, therefore, to decide how to use policy
instruments in practice.
This paper has the following goals: first, following
ANDRE´ and CARDENETE (2005) and Q1ANDRE´ et al.
(2008), it addresses the problem of designing economic
policies in a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain) from
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a multicriteria point of view. By doing so, it somehow
departs from the traditional, more theoretical approach
in which the policy-maker is assumed to maximize
social welfare. Instead, a more pragmatic and operational
approach is used by assuming that the policy-maker has a
number of policy objectives and policy-making is
focused on optimizing these objectives, which seems
more in line with reality. Moreover, it is shown that
the approach can be seen as a generalization of the
usual welfare maximizing approach. Second, this
approach is applied to the design of so-called efficient
subsidy policies in a regional economy. More specifically,
the paper focuses on the design of efficient subsidy pol-
icies under two different scenarios. In a first exercise, it is
assumed that policy-makers take into account only two
objectives: output variation and the profitability of a key
strategic sector such as agriculture. In a second exercise,
the scope of the mentioned approach is extended by
addressing policy problems with more than two objec-
tives (ANDRE´ and CARDENETE, 2005; andQ1 ANDRE´
et al., 2008, stick to bicriteria problems). Finally, the
paper aims at testing if the observed subsidy policy in
Andalusia is efficient or, on the contrary, it could be
Pareto-improved in some direction.
The second section identifies the main elements
required to represent policy-making as a multicriteria
problem in a general equilibrium setting and the
concept of efficient policies is defined. The third section
presents the economic model used for the application
and the database used to calibrate the model. The
fourth section introduces some basic information
about the application, including some basic description
about the regional framework and the selection of
policy instruments. The fifth section presents the
results of two different problems. In the first case it is
assumed that the regional policy-makers are concerned
just about two objectives. The second case deals with
the problem of designing subsidy policies when the
government cares about more criteria. The sixth
section summarizes the main findings of the paper and
suggests some future lines of research.
GENERAL SETTING: EQUILIBRIUM AND
MULTICRITERIA POLICY DESIGN
Assume there are m economic agents (typically, consu-
mers and firms), indexed by h ¼ 1, . . . , m, who are
assumed to act rationally in the sense that they choose
the values for their decision variables (denoted as a
vector zh) to maximize their objective function fh. Typi-
cally, consumers make consumption and saving
decisions to maximize utility and firms decide their
factor demand and goods supply to maximize profits.
Assume also the government has a vector x of policy
instruments, which may include taxes, public expendi-
ture and investment, interest rates, and so on.
The decision problem of agent h can be represented
as choosing zh to:
Max fh(zh, x) subject to: zh [ Rh( p, zh, x) (1)
where Rh is the feasible set of agent h; z2h is the
decisions of the rest of agents (different from h); p is a
vector of prices; and x is the policy variables.
Let Zh
(p,Z2h,x) denote the optimal response of
agent h, i.e., the values of his decision variables which
maximize fh, given z2h, p and x. The interaction
among agents provides the equilibrium value for prices,
pe, and the decision variables of all the agents,
Ze(x) ; (Z1e(x), . . . zem(x)) ,in such a way that, given
the value of the policy variables, all the agents are
making optimal decisions and markets clear.
Aggregating ze, the value of the relevant macroeco-
nomic variables in equilibrium is obtained (for example,
gross domestic product results from the aggregation of
outputs from all the firms, the consumer price index
results from the weighted average of the prices of
goods and services, and so on). Assume the government
is interested on K macroeconomic aggregates denoted
as Z1,. . ., Zk, which can be obtained from z
e according
to some aggregation rules:
Z1 ; Z1(ze(x)), . . . , ZK ; ZK (ze(x)) (2)
If a policy-maker knows the response functions
Zh
(p,Z2h,x) of all the agents and the aggregation
rules in (2), he can obtain the values of the policy objec-
tives as a function of x. If there was a single policy objec-
tive Z (K ¼ 1), the optimal design of the economic
policy would result from optimizing Z subject to (1)
and (2). In practice, there are typically several policy
objectives presenting some trade-off between them.
Therefore, policy-makers actually face a multicriteria
problem. Following ANDRE´ and CARDENETE (2005),
the present paper proposes to use multi-objective pro-
gramming, which is a multicriteria technique aimed
at determining the set of efficient solutions. For some
recent developments and applications of this technique,
see Q2CABALLERO et al. (2007), DOERNER et al. (2007),
GABRIEL et al. (2006) or HUNG et al. (2006). In the
present context, the multi-objective design of policies
can be represented by the following problem:
Eff Z ; Z1, . . . , ZK½ 
subject to:(1), (2), x [ X
(3)
where Eff is the search for efficient policies; and X is the
feasible set for the policy instruments. A feasible policy
(i.e., a value of x [ X) is said to be efficient if it provides
some values of the objective variables Z such that there
is no feasible policy that achieves the same of better per-
formance for all the policy objectives being strictly
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better for at least one policy objective. Note that this
concept of efficiency departs from another usual
concept of efficient solution in economics, as that situ-
ation in which the total surplus of economic agents is
maximized. Here a more operational concept is used
from the point of view of the policy-maker based on
those variables which are considered as policy objec-
tives. On the other hand, if fh is defined to denote
the surplus of agent h and total surplus is given byP
h¼1
m fh, the traditional problem of maximizing total
surplus can be seen as a particular case of (3) with
K¼1 and Z ¼Ph¼1m fh.
To make this approach operational, some model to
represent the economy under study was also needed,
i.e. some specific contents for the decision variables
zh, the objective functions fh and the interactions
among economic agents. That part of the study is devel-
oped in the next section.
MODEL AND DATA
The multicriteria conception of policy-making dis-
played above could, in principle, be compatible with
any economic model representing the decisions of
economic agents and the interactions among them
under different policy scenarios. The specific model
should be selected by the researcher or the policy-
maker according to the goals of the analysis. This
paper combines the multicriteria approach presented
above with a CGE model.
The economic model
A CGE model is used following the basic principles of
the Walrasian equilibrium – as given by SCARF and
SHOVEN (1984) or SHOVEN and WHALLEY (1992).
These kinds of models have been widely used for
policy analysis. For some recent applications, see
HAGGER et al. (2003), NAASTEPAD (2003), SAVARD
(2005), and YAO and LIU (2000); for the state of the
art, see KEHOE et al. (2005).
Following the CGE tradition, this model performs a
structural disaggregated representation of the activity
sectors in the economy and the equilibrium of
markets according to basic microeconomic principles.
Taxes and the activity of the public sector are taken as
exogenous by consumers and firms, while they are con-
sidered as decision variables by the government. Assum-
ing that consumers maximize their utility and firms
maximize their profits (net of taxes), then the model
provides an equilibrium solution; that is, a price
vector for all goods and inputs, a vector of activity
levels and a value for public income. In equilibrium,
supply equals demand in all the markets (‘markets clear-
ance’) and public income equals the total payments from
all economic agents. To save some space, some basic
features of the model are only presented. For a more
detailed description of the model, see CARDENETE
and SANCHO (2003b) or ANDRE´ et al. (2005).
The model comprises 25 productive sectors in order
to match the social accounting matrix (SAM) (for a list
of the sectors, see Table 1). Since a focus is made on
aggregate results, the exact number of sectors con-
sidered is not crucial. In general, the level of disaggrega-
tion is an arbitrary decision of the researcher or the
policy-maker.
There is one representative firm in each sector, a
single representative consumer, one public sector and
one foreign sector (which, in this application, represents
the commercial relationships between Andalusia and
the rest of world, including the rest of Spain and any
other countries). The production technology is
described by a nested production function: the domestic
output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by
Xdj, is obtained by combining, through a Leontief tech-
nology, outputs from the rest of sectors and the value
added VAj. This value added is generated from
primary inputs (labour, L; and capital, K ), combined
by a Cobb–Douglas technology. Overall output of
sector j, Qj, is obtained from a Cobb–Douglas combi-
nation of domestic output and imports Xrowj, according
to the ARMINGTON (1969) hypothesis, in which dom-
estic and imported products are taken as imperfect
substitutes.
There are 25 different goods – corresponding to
productive sectors – and a representative consumer
who demands present consumption goods and saves
the remainder of his disposable income after paying
taxes. The government raises taxes to obtain public
revenue, R, as well as it gives transfers to the private
sector, TPS, and demands goods and services GDj
from each sector j ¼ 1, . . . , 25. PD is the final
balance (surplus or deficit) of the public budget (in
Table 1. Productive sectors in the social accounting matrix
(SAM)
1. Agriculture 14. Vehicles
2. Cattle and forestry 15. Transport
3. Fishing 16. Food
4. Extractives 17. Manufacturing of textiles
and leather
5. Refine 18. Manufacturing of wood
6. Electricity 19. Other manufactures
7. Gas 20. Construction
8. Water 21. Commerce
9. Mining 22. Transport and Q6communications
10. Manufacturing of
construction material
23. Other services
11. Chemicals 24. Sales services
12. Manufacturing of
metal products
25. Non-sales services
13. Machinery
Source: CARDENETE and SANCHO (2003a).
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nominal terms):
PD ¼ R  TPS  cpi 
X25
j¼1
GDj  pj (4)
where cpi is the consumer price index; and pj is a pro-
duction price index before value added tax (VAT) refer-
ring to all goods produced by sector j. The consumer
price index is calculated as a weighted average of the
prices of all sectors, according to the participation of
each one in the overall consumption of the economy.
Consumer disposable income (YD) equals labour and
capital income, plus transfers, minus direct taxes:
YD ¼ w  L þ r  K þ cpi  TPS þ TROW
 DT (r  K þ cpi  TPS þ TROW )
DT (w  L  WC  w  L)  WC  w  L
(5)
where w and r are input (labour and capital) prices; and
L and K are input quantities (labour and capital) sold by
the consumer; TROW is transfers received by the con-
sumer from the rest of the world; DT is the tax rate of
the income tax; and WC is the tax rate corresponding to
the payment of the employees to social security (ESS).
The consumer’s objective is to maximize his utility
(welfare), subject to his budget constraint. Welfare is
obtained from consumption goods CDj ( j ¼ 1, . . . ,
25) and savings SD, according to a Cobb–Douglas
utility function, that gives rise to the following optim-
ization problem:
max U (CD1, . . . , CD25, SD) ¼
Y25
j¼1
CD
aj
j
 !
SDb
subject to
X25
j¼1
pjCDj þ pinv SD ¼ YD
(6)
where pinv is an investment price index. Savings, SD,
can be defined as the amount of income which is not
consumed.
Regarding investment and saving, this is a saving
driven model. The closure rule is defined in such a
way that investment is exogenous, savings are deter-
mined from the consumer’s decision, and both variables
are related with the public and foreign sectors by the
following identity:
X25
j¼1
INVj  pinv ¼ SD  pinv þ PD þ ROWD (7)
where INVj is investment in sector j; and ROWD is the
balance of the foreign sector.
Labour and capital demands are computed under the
assumption that firms minimize the cost of producing
value added. Since a short-term analysis is made, in
the capital market it is considered that supply is perfectly
inelastic. For labour supply, the following approach is
used that shows a feedback between the real wage and
the unemployment rate, related to the power of
unions or other factors inducing frictions in the
labour market:
w
cpi
¼ 1u
1u0
 1
b
(8)
where u and u0 are the unemployment rates in the simu-
lation and in the benchmark equilibrium, respectively;
w/cpi is the real wage; and b is a flexibility parameter.
This formulation is consistent with an institutional
setting where the employers decide the amount of
labour demanded and workers decide real wage taking
into account the unemployment rate (KEHOE et al.,
1995): if labour demand increases (decreases), the unem-
ployment rate u decreases (increases) and workers
demand higher (lower) real wages. If, after the simu-
lation, employment remains unchanged, the real wage
is the same as in the benchmark equilibrium. For the
empirical exercises, an estimated value for Spain is
taken from the econometric literature: b ¼ 1.25
(ANDRE´S et al. 1990).
Realgross domestic product (GDP) is calculated
from the expenditure point of view by aggregating
the values of private consumption, investment, public
expenditure and net exports using constant prices.
Databases and Calibration
The main data used in this paper are those contained in
the SAM of Andalusia 1995 (for the technical details
about the construction of this matrix, see CARDENETE
and SANCHO, 2003a), that is, the more recent one
which is officially available. The SAM comprises 40
accounts, including 25 productive sectors, as shown in
Table 1, two inputs (labour and capital), a saving/invest-
ment account, a government account, direct taxes
(income tax and ESS) and indirect taxes (VAT, payroll
tax, output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a repre-
sentative consumer.
The numerical values for the parameters in the
model are obtained by calibration (for example,
MANSUR and WHALLEY, 1984). Specifically, the
following parameters are calibrated: all the technical
coefficients of the production functions, all the tax
rates and the coefficients of the utility function. The
calibration criterion is that of reproducing the 1995
SAM as an initial equilibrium for the economy, which
is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such
an equilibrium, all the prices and activity levels are
set equal to 1 and, therefore, after the simulation it is
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possible to observe directly the change rate of relative
prices and activity levels. When finding the economic
equilibrium corresponding to the policy combinations
in the optimization exercises, the interest rate is taken
as numeraire and the rest of the prices are allowed to
vary as required to meet equilibrium conditions.
APPLICATION: DESIGNING AN EFFICIENT
SUBSIDY POLICY IN ANDALUSIA
Regional framework: Andalusia
Andalusia, which is a large region in the south of Spain,
has been designated by the European Union as an
Objective 1 region (for more information, see LIMA
and CARDENETE, 2007). Moreover, it is also the
Spanish region that has traditionally received the
largest amount of public subsidies because of its econ-
omic situation, geographical extension and population.
The causes of inequality in this economy can be
explained by the important lack of infrastructures,
necessary to develop the economic activity, and the
need of a better qualification of human capital in all
educational levels. Andalusia has received an important
financial support from Europe since the European
Union approved the first Community Support Frame-
work (CSF). In this document, the European Commis-
sion signed an agreement with national governments to
determine the European financial grants for the period
1989–93. The same trend has occurred for the periods
1994–99, 2000–06 and also at the beginning of CSF
2007–13. In Spain, all the funds received from
Europe have been managed by the Central Government
and the Regional Governments. Actually, the Regional
Governments have a high degree of freedom to allocate
the subsidy funds across sectors in order to impulse
different economic activities.
In the case of Andalusia, a large number of sectors
receive a net subsidy on production. According to the
SAM of Andalusia 1995, all the activity sectors listed
in Table 1 received a positive net subsidy on production
(defined as the difference between subsidies and output
taxes) except sectors 3 (Fishing), 5 (Refine), 10 (Manu-
facturing of Construction Material), 21 (Commerce),
23 (Other Services) and 25 (Non Sales Services).
Setting the policy-making problem: policy instruments and
policy objectives
For the policy-making problem to be fully described,
one needs to select, first, the policy instruments and,
second, the policy objectives.
Concerning policy instruments, focus is made on the
design of an efficient subsidy policy at the regional level.
Therefore, the net subsidy rates of those sectors that
received a net subsidy in the benchmark situation are
selected as policy variables. The subsidy rate is defined
as the ratio of the net subsidy (total subsidy minus
taxes on production) over the value of domestic
output in the sector, i.e., the net subsidy per unit of
domestic output.
In order to avoid obtaining policy recommendations
unrealistically far away from real applied policies, the
following constraints on the policy instruments were
assumed:
. The sectors that are not subsidized, in net terms, in
the benchmark situation (the observed values in
Andalusia, 1995) are assumed to remain being non-
subsidized.
. For the sectors that are subsidized in the benchmark
situation, two feasible bounds for the new (simulated)
subsidy rate are set: the lower bound is zero (meaning
that the subsidy is fully eliminated) and the upper
bound is the observed value times 1.5 (meaning that
the subsidy rate is increased in a 50%).
. The rest of policy instruments (VAT, income tax,
public expenditure, etc.) are assume to have the
same value as in the benchmark situation.
For the problem to be fully described, it is necessary
to specify the relevant policy objectives. The next
section presents, first, a problem with two objectives
and, second, a problem with more than two policy
objectives.
RESULTS
A bicriteria problem: output variations versus agricultural profit
As discussed in the previous section, due to different
reasons, the economic policy in Andalusia is, to a
large extent, based on subsidies. The agricultural
sector is one of the key activity sectors in the Andalusia,
and one of sectors that have been traditionally subsi-
dized. Since the beginning of the 1980s, this sector
has received an important amount of funds from the
European Community in an attempt to modernize
and develop this activity.
Based on this observation, the section starts by setting
a problem in which the regional government is assumed
to design its subsidy policy according to two objectives.
The first objective is to foster the overall activity of the
economy in real terms. This objective is represented as
the maximization of output variation, denoted by DQ,
with respect to the benchmark situation. The second
objective is to increase the profit of the agricultural
sector in order to make this activity as profitable as poss-
ible. This objective is represented as the maximization
of the firms profit in the agricultural sector (as measured
by the gross exploitation surplus). For the sake of nor-
malization, focus is made on the growth rate of profit
with respect to the benchmark situation, denoted as
DpAgric, rather than the value of profit itself in absolute
terms. The rationale under the selection of these objec-
tives is that the government might be interested in pro-
moting a key activity sector (such as the agricultural
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one) but, on the other hand, it probably does not want
to do it at the expense of damaging too much the
economy as a whole.
Ideally, the government would like to design a
subsidy policy such that both objectives could reach a
very high score. Therefore, the first step is to assess if
these objectives are mutually compatible or, on the con-
trary, both of them conflict with each other. The degree
of compatibility or conflict between both objectives can
be studied by computing the so-called payoff matrix.
This is done by solving two monocriteria problems
which consist of optimizing each objective separately
disregarding the other one. First, the maximum value
of the output variation is computed, subject to the
specified constraints on the policy variables and all the
equations of the model. This maximum value is referred
to as the ideal value of the output variation and denoted
as DQ. By plugging the optimal values of the policy
variables (in or case, net subsidies) xDQ ¼ arg max DQ
in the relevant equations of the model, an associated
value of the firms profit variation in the agricultural
sector is obtained. Both of these values are displayed
in the first row of the pay-off matrix (Table 2). In the
same way, the ideal value of the agricultural profit incre-
ment DpAgric
 and the associated value of the output
variation are obtained. The worst (¼minimum) value
of each column is the anti-ideal value for the associated
objective: DQ and DpAgric, which correspond to the
achievement of each objective, when the other one is
optimized.
The first row of Table 2 shows that it would be poss-
ible to implement a subsidy policy in order to obtain an
output increment DQ ¼ 1.99%. As a by-product of
this policy, the profit of agricultural firms would experi-
ence a modest increment of 0.25%. The second row
shows that (as a consequence of a different subsidy
policy) it would be possible to increase the agricultural
profit in 1.93%.Q3 Nevertheless, this policy would imply
that a reduction in the overall output of the economy
is 0.74%. The values in the main diagonal (the
maximum output variation and the maximum agricul-
tural profit increment) represent the ideal point and the
vector with the worst element of each row gives the
so-called anti-ideal point.
From Table 2 it can be concluded that there is
some degree of conflict between both objectives in the
sense that it is not possible to get at the same time the
maximum output variation and maximum increment of
the agricultural profit. This conflict is an essential
element to have a genuine multicriteria (in this case,
bicriteria) problem. Since it is no possible to achieve
the optimal value of both objectives simultaneously, the
policy-maker must establish some compromise between
them.
The second step is to determine the set of efficient
policies. In this case, a policy combination x providing
the objective values (DQ, DpAgric) is said to be efficient
if there is not another feasible policy, say x0, providing
(DQ0, DpAgric0) such that either DQ0 DQ and
DpAgric
0 . DpAgric, or DQ0 . DQ and DpAgric0 
DpAgric. An approximation to the efficient set is
obtained using the so-called constraint method, which
consists of optimizing one of the objectives, while
the other one is placed as a parametric constraint. In
the present case, a grid is made for the feasible values
of DpAgric, from 0.25 to 1.93. Let Dpn denote one
specific value of DpAgric in the grid. For each of
these values, the problem max DQ is solved subject
to the constraint DpAgric  Dpn and all the equations
in the model (it is arbitrary which objective is parame-
terized and which one is optimized in every point).
Fig. 1 illustrates the results of these calculations with
ten efficient combinations denoted as E1, . . ., E10. The
line connecting this points represents a frontier of effi-
cient policies. The combinations below this frontier
can be considered as being inefficient, whereas the
combinations above it are infeasible. It can be seen
that, along the efficient frontier, there is a monotonic
relationship between output variation and the incre-
ment of agricultural profit, but the trade-off between
both rates, as measured by the slope of the frontier, is
not constant. As a matter of fact, the frontier is
concave, which means that increasing agricultural
profit (moving from left to right) implies an increasing
cost in terms of lost overall output.
Table 3 displays the subsidy rate as a percentage of
production in the original benchmark situation (sha-
dowed column) as well as in every of the efficient
points in Fig. 1. The first thing that can be noted is
that, in all the points of the frontier, the subsidy of the
Table 2. Pay-off matrix output variations versus profit in
agriculture
DQ (%) DpAgric (%)
Max DQ 1.99 0.25
Max DpAgric –0.74 1.93
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Fig. 1. Trade-off between agricultural profit and output
variation
Designing Efficient Subsidy Policies in a Regional Economy 7
665
670
675
680
685
690
695
700
705
710
715
720
725
730
735
740
745
750
755
760
765
770
agricultural sector (sector 1) remains at its maximum
allowed value, i.e., 50% more than in the original situ-
ation. The conclusion that can be drawn from this result
is that increasing the subsidy of the agricultural sector
appears to be a policy change which is consistent both
with increasing agricultural profit and increasing
overall output in the short-term.
When moving from E1 to E10, the required value of
the agricultural profit increases while total output
decreases. Since the agricultural subsidy is already at
its maximum feasible level, this profit increment can
only be achieved by altering the value of other policy
variables (in this case, by changing the subsidies of
other sectors). The data in Table 3 illustrate that any
of the efficient points obtained in Fig. 1 require a con-
centration of subsidies in fewer sectors. As a matter of
fact, in any of the efficient points, the model rec-
ommends an increase in the subsidy rate of sectors 2
(Cattle and Forestry), 8 (Water) and 16 (Food) to their
maximum feasible levels. Note that these sectors have
some complementarity connections with Agriculture.
On the other hand, when moving from E1 to E10, the
subsidies of many other sectors are eliminated.
Fig. 2 displays a summary of the general evolution of
subsidies across the efficient points, including the
number of subsidized sectorsQ4 (purple bars) and the total
public net expenditure in terms of subsidies (blue
dotted line). It can be seen that a higher required
valued for agricultural profit comes hand with hand
with a reduction in the number of subsidized sectors
and a smaller amount of expenditure devoted to subsidies.
The interpretation of this fact is the following: if one
wants to benefit the agricultural sector, and it is not
possible to increase its subsidy, one possible thing to do
is to increase the subsidies of those sectors that are comp-
lementary to Agriculture and eliminate the subsidies of
other sectors in such a way that Agriculture has the
same treatment in absolute terms but a better treatment
in relative terms (as compared with the rest of sectors).
A problem with more than two criteria
In order to enlarge the scope of the discussion made so
far, consider the possibility that the government is con-
cerned about a larger number of criteria. To illustrate
the way to deal with this kind of setting, assume the
government has two types of objectives: general econ-
omic objectives and strategic sectorial objectives.
Fig. 2. Number of subsidized sectors and the total amount
spent in subsidies across efficient points in the bicriteria problem
Table 3. Net subsidy by sectors in a benchmark situation and in efficient points in the bicriteria problem
Subsidy rate (%) in efficient point, En
Sector Bench E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 E10
1 2.98 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48 4.48
2 3.09 4.64 4.60 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64 4.64
4 36.22 54.33 54.30 54.33 36.92 7.89 – – – – –
6 3.04 1.44 – 4.56 4.56 4.56 – – – – –
7 7.97 11.95 12.00 11.95 11.95 11.95 – – – – –
8 2.69 4.04 4.00 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04 4.04
9 0.55 0.82 – – – – – – – – –
11 9.51 14.26 14.30 14.26 14.26 14.26 14.26 14.26 14.26 14.26 –
12 2.87 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 4.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 – –
13 19.66 0.00 2.60 29.49 29.49 29.49 29.49 22.84 0.89 – –
14 36.02 54.04 54.04 54.04 54.04 54.04 54.04 22.13 – – –
15 5.67 8.50 8.50 6.25 – – – – – – –
16 9.59 14.38 14.40 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38
17 16.25 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.38 24.38 20.51 –
18 5.90 8.85 8.80 8.85 8.85 8.85 0.55 – – – –
19 10.06 15.09 15.09 15.09 15.09 15.09 15.09 15.09 15.09 – –
20 3.64 – – 0.30 1.08 1.96 3.77 5.47 5.47 5.47 5.47
22 5.08 7.61 3.80 – – – – – – – –
24 4.80 – – – – – – – – – –
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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Among the general economic objectives, it is
assumed that the government is concerned, first,
about the variation of output with respect to the bench-
mark situation (see the previous section). Since the gov-
ernment is also supposed to aim at increasing social
welfare, included as an objective is (the maximization
of) compensating variation (CV ) which is a conven-
tional welfare measure in monetary terms (for
example, MAS-COLELL et al., 1995, p. 82). CV is arbi-
trarily set to zero in the observed situation, in such a way
that CV . 0 (, 0) means that, after implementing the
analysed policy combination, the consumers are better
off (worse off) than before implementing it. The third
objective is to minimize the public deficit, which is
denoted as –PD (since the balance of the public
budget is always negative, both in the observed situation
and in all the simulated cases). The fourth objective is to
minimize the unemployment rate, u.
Concerning the sectorial objectives, assume the gov-
ernment is particularly interested in ensuring the viabi-
lity of some key strategic sectors. Assume these sectors
are sector 1 (Agriculture), 20 (Construction) and 22
(Transports and Communications). Therefore, the gov-
ernment sets as policy objectives maximizing the profit
(as measured by the gross exploitation surplus) of these
sectors. For the sake of normalization, focus is made on
the increment of profit with respect to the benchmark
situation, denoted as Dp1, Dp20 and Dp22, respectively.
By solving seven monocriteria problems, the pay-off
matrix is obtained, which is shown in Table 4. As in the
previous exercises, the values in the main diagonal,
which are emboldened, represent the ideal point,
whereas the vector containing the worst value for
each column (italicized) is the anti-ideal point. A
visual inspection of the matrix allows the identification
of some conflicts among objectives.
This section first focuses on general macroeconomic
policy objectives. It turns out that output variation,
consumer welfare (as measured by compensatory vari-
ation) and unemployment minimization have a joint
behaviour in the sense that there is no conflict among
them. Actually, the optimization of the two first objec-
tives provides exactly the same solution, whereas unem-
ployment minimization provides a very similar solution.
On the other hand, these three objectives strongly
conflict with public deficit minimization, since opti-
mizing any of these objectives results in a public
deficit well above the minimum attainable level and
minimizing public deficit provides very poor results
for output variation, consumer welfare and unemploy-
ment minimization. It is remarkable that unemploy-
ment shows a low degree of sensitivity with respect to
any macroeconomic policy, since the range of variation
of u is very small. This result is coherent with other
existing studies for Andalusia in the literature (for
example, CARDENETE and SANCHO, 2003b) and it
amounts to the notably high values of unemployment
displayed in Table 4. Recall that unemployment has tra-
ditionally been a very hard problem in Spain (for
example, BLANCHARD et al., 1995) and especially in
Andalusia. For example, in 1993 the unemployment
rate was 23.90% in Spain and 34.18% in Andalusia. In
2002 it was 11.36% in Spain and 19.65% in Andalusia
(data from the Andalusian Statistical Institute – IEA).
Concerning sectorial objectives, as discussed above,
maximizing the profitability of the agricultural sector
(sector number 1) clearly conflicts with the objective
of maximizing output variation, and note that it also
conflicts with the maximization of compensatory vari-
ation and, to some extent, with unemployment mini-
mization. The profitability of the transports sector
(number 22) conflicts even more clearly with output
variation, consumer welfare and unemployment mini-
mization. On the other hand, any of these general
objectives displays a very clear conflict with the profit-
ability of the construction sector (number 20). Finally,
the profitability of Construction and Transports seem
to conflict very clearly with each other and any of
them have a moderate degree of conflict with the agri-
cultural sector.
The paper now illustrates two alternative ways to
obtain efficient policies: the previously used constraint
method and the weighting method (for example,
BALLESTERO and ROMERO, 1998). To apply the con-
straint method, a single objective needs to be optimized
while keeping the rest as parametric constraints. To
illustrate the use of this technique, all objectives are
forced except the one being optimized to have a value
Table 4. Pay-off matrix of the problem with seven objectives
DQ CV PD u Dp1 Dp20 Dp22
Max DQ 1.99 7871.61 108 396.95 33 0.25 3.94 0.48
Max CV 1.99 7871.61 108 396.95 33 0.25 3.94 0.48
Max PD –4.08 –40 127.87 72 773.80 38 1.40 –1.52 0.99
Min u 1.98 7811.18 108 360.29 33 0.26 3.73 0.47
Max Dp1 –0.74 –11 709.20 96 890.17 33 1.93 2.49 –0.69
Max Dp20 1.57 5461.34 109 432.74 37 0.68 4.80 –1.18
Max Dp22 –3.19 –32 366.48 79 293.65 34 0.53 –1.65 2.72
Notes: DQ, u, Dp1, Dp20 and Dp22 are measured in percentages. CVand PD are measured in E10
6. Emboldened values in the Q7main diagonal are
the ideal point; italicized values are the vector containing the worst value for each column.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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equal to or better than that in the observed situation.
The observed values (taken from the databases reported
in the third section) are as follows:
DQ ¼ CV ¼ Dp1 ¼ Dp20 ¼ Dp22 ¼ 0, PD
¼ 110800:67, u ¼ 33:9% (9)
where PD and CV are measured in millions of euros.
Thus, the first candidate point is obtained by solving
the following problem:
MaxDQ subject to:CV  0, PD  110800:67,
u  33:9, Dp1  0,
Dp20  0, Dp22  0,
all the equations of the model
(10)
The solution of problem (10) is represented in the
first row of Table 5. Note that this combination
Pareto-dominates the observed situation (9), since not
only output increases with respect to the observed
one, but also the CV is larger, public deficit and unem-
ployment are lower, and the profits of all the target
sector are higher than in the benchmark situation.
Therefore, it is concluded that, according to the
setting, the observed policy displays some degree of
inefficiency and it could be unambiguously improved
with respect to the seven objectives considered here.
By doing similar calculations for each objective, six
more combinations are obtained, which are displayed
in Table 5. Note again that the solution for the two
first criteria (output variation and compensating vari-
ation) are identical. Moreover, the solutions for these
criteria are exactly the same as those in Table 4. The
reason is simply that the constraints imposed when
solving problem (10) are not binding since the uncon-
strained optima shown in Table 4 dominate the
observed situation for all the objectives. Nevertheless,
the situation is different for other rows in Table 5,
since the unconstrained optimal values (those in
Table 4) do not meet the requirement that no objective
achieves a worse value than in the benchmark situation.
This makes the constrained optima being different from
the unconstrained ones.
A sufficient condition for the constraint method to
provide efficient solutions is that all the parametric con-
straints are binding. Since this is not the case for some
constraints, one cannot ensure that all the solutions dis-
played in Table 5 are efficient, although any of them
Pareto-dominates the observed situation. The fact that
these combinations dominate the observed situation
ensures that the policy actually implement is inefficient
with respect to the selected objective.
In order to find solutions that can guarantee they are
efficient, two possibilities are obtained: the first still uses
the constraint method and makes the parametric con-
straints tougher by increasing the value of the ‘more is
better objectives’ (DQ, CV, Dp1, Dp20 and Dp22)
and/or decreasing the value of the ‘less is better’ objec-
tives (–PD and u) until a solution is found in which all
the constraint are binding at the same time.
The second approach is to use the so-called weight-
ing method. This method consists of maximizing the
following sum of normalized value of objectives:
X7
i¼1
vgi
gi  gi
gi  gi
(11)
where gi is the achieved value for objective i ¼ 1, . . ., 7,
i.e., g 1 = r Q , . . ., g 7 = r p22, and each objective is
normalized by subtracting the anti-ideal value and
dividing by the difference between the ideal and the
anti-ideal value (taken from Table 4). For each gi, the
resulting ratio is bounded by construction between
zero (when the objective is equal to the anti-ideal)
and 1 (when it is equal to the ideal). This normalization
eliminates units of measurement and allows the addition
having mathematical and economic sense. The coeffi-
cients v gi are preference parameters representing how
concerned the policy-maker is about each objective i.
The policy combination obtained is illustrated with
vg1= ... =vg7, meaning that the policy-maker is
equally concerned about the level of achievement of
all the objectives. The maximization of (11) with this
set of weights gives the following solution:
DQ ¼ 0.21%, CV ¼ E2 23.49  106, PD ¼ E108
147.12  106, u ¼ 33.9%, D p1 ¼ 0.77%, D p20 ¼
1.12%, and D p22 ¼ 21.15%
which is an efficient solution by construction. Note
that this procedure ensures that the solutions found are
efficient (provided v gi . 0 for all the objectives), but it
does not guarantee that all the criteria improve with
respect to the observed situation. Actually, the solution
found for equal weights does not Pareto-dominate the
observed solution in Andalusia 1995 since some
policy objectives improve and other worsen with
respect to the observed situation. By testing different
Table 5. Using the constraint method with respect to the
observed situation
DQ CV PD u Dp1 Dp20 Dp22
Max DQ 1.99 7871.61 108 396.95 0.33 0.25 3.94 0.48
Max CV 1.99 7871.61 108 396.95 0.33 0.25 3.94 0.48
Max PD 0.75 655.03 105 104.28 0.34 0.80 3.30 0.37
Min u 1.74 7172.33 109 274.53 0.33 0.27 4.01 0.58
Max Dp1 0.53 363.16 108 395.84 0.34 1.38 3.19 0.00
Max Dp20 1.73 6594.76 108 992.69 0.33 0.47 4.40 0.00
Max Dp22 0.40 461.90 110 794.67 0.34 0.00 2.57 1.33
Notes: DQ, u, Dp1, Dp20 and Dp22 are measured in percentages. CV
and PD are measured in E106.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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combinations of weights, different efficient solutions are
obtained that might respond to different preference
configurations of the policy-maker.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper claims that economic policy-making can be
suitably represented as a multicriteria problem for a
double reason. Firstly, from a conceptual perspective,
it seems a sensible way to understand and represent
the concerns and the procedures actually followed by
policy-makers. Secondly, from an empirical perspective,
multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) techniques
can be of considerable help to get operative policy rec-
ommendations and, therefore, to decide how to use
policy instruments in practice.
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
properly calibrated for the Andalusian economy allows
one to analyse the subsidy policy and to identify efficient
subsidy combinations once the relevant policy criteria
have been identified.
Under the assumption that the policy-maker is con-
cerned only about two policy objectives (output vari-
ation and the increment of profit in the agricultural
sector), it turns out that there is a conflict between
both of them. This means that it is not possible to
obtain the best possible result for both objectives at
the same time or, in other words, there is a trade-off
between increasing agricultural profit and increasing
overall output. By studying the efficient policies, the
following conclusions were derived. First, increasing
the subsidy of the agricultural sector is a policy
change that appears to be consistent with both increas-
ing agricultural profit and increasing overall output.
Second, when the policy-maker gets more concerned
about increasing agricultural profit (and is willing to
accept a lower value of total output), the model rec-
ommends that one increases the subsidies of those
sectors that are complementary to Agriculture and
eliminate the subsidies of other sectors.
Enlarging the number of objectives makes the
problem computationally more demanding but also
more interesting and realistic. By including seven
policy objectives, it has been shown that the observed
policy could have been unambiguously improved in a
number of ways depending on the weight given by
the policy-maker to each objective.
This paper aims at providing a first approximation to
the multicriteria analysis of policy-making in a regional
economy and getting some initial insights in this frame-
work. The analysis can be extended and improved in a
number of ways. First, it would be possible to construct
a model at two levels: regional and nationwide. This
would allow one to consider trade-offs and conflicts
between regional and national considerations. Second,
the analysis has been restricted to a short-term
approach. A dynamic version of the model could be
used to address intertemporal issues related to policy
efficiency. Finally, another line for improvement is to
refine the definition and selection of policy objectives.
These extensions are left for future work, since the fun-
damental contribution of this paper is not the model
itself, but rather to suggest a methodological line of
research combining different analytical instruments: a
structural economic model, such as a CGE model,
and a more operational tool, such as MCDM.
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